Ranking judgments in Arrow's setting
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Publication:987464
DOI10.1007/S11229-009-9568-YzbMATH Open1205.03012DBLPjournals/synthese/Porello10OpenAlexW1968596541WikidataQ62047315 ScholiaQ62047315MaRDI QIDQ987464FDOQ987464
Publication date: 13 August 2010
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9568-y
first-order logicArrow's theoremdiscursive dilemmaaggregation of ranking judgmentsConodorcet's paradox
Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
- A generalised model of judgment aggregation
- Aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared. With a comment by Isaac Levi
- Logical constraints on judgement aggregation
- Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation
- Axiomatizing collective judgment sets in a minimal logical language
- A simple proof of Sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions
Cited In (5)
Recommendations
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