Ranking judgments in Arrow's setting

DOI10.1007/S11229-009-9568-YMaRDI QIDQ987464zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Daniele Porello

Publication date 13 August 2010

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9568-y

zbMATH Keywords

first-order logicArrow's theoremdiscursive dilemmaaggregation of ranking judgmentsConodorcet's paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
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Cites work

• A generalised model of judgment aggregation
• A simple proof of Sen's possibility theorem on majority decisions
• Aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared. With a comment by Isaac Levi
• Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
• Axiomatizing collective judgment sets in a minimal logical language
• Belief merging and the discursive dilemma: an argument-based account to paradoxes of judgment aggregation
• Logical constraints on judgement aggregation
• Social choice and individual values

Cited in

(6)

• Lifting integrity constraints in binary aggregation
• Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation
• An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
• Judgement and ranking: living with hidden bias
• Natural deduction for modal logic of judgment aggregation
• Judgment aggregation in nonmonotonic logic

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