Lifting integrity constraints in binary aggregation

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2013.05.001zbMath1284.91138OpenAlexW2064732596MaRDI QIDQ2446586

Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi

Publication date: 17 April 2014

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.308.6705

zbMATH Keywords

computational social choicejudgment aggregationcollective decision makingcombinatorial votemulti-issue domains

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

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