Bayesian learning in fish wars: dynamic estimation of unknown states and private information
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Publication:6587004
zbMATH Open1542.91036MaRDI QIDQ6587004FDOQ6587004
Authors: Jiangjing Zhou, Ovanes L. Petrosyan 
Publication date: 13 August 2024
Published in: Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i eë Prilozheniya (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
- Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Games and dynamic games
- Strategic dynamic interaction. Fish wars
- The compleat fish wars: Biological and dynamic interactions
- Learning and technological progress in dynamic games
- On Nash equilibrium solutions in stochastic dynamic games
- A cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
- Regime shifts and uncertainty in pollution control
- A Bayesian learning model for estimating unknown demand parameter in revenue management
- Analysis and computation of adaptive defense strategies against advanced persistent threats for cyber-physical systems
- Safe learning-based observers for unknown nonlinear systems using Bayesian optimization
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