Necessary gradient restrictions at the core of a voting rule
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Publication:1633652
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.006zbMath1418.91196OpenAlexW2890045247MaRDI QIDQ1633652
Publication date: 20 December 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.006
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Cites Work
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- Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria
- The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
- Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
- Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions
- Convex Analysis
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