Necessary gradient restrictions at the core of a voting rule

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.08.006zbMATH Open1418.91196OpenAlexW2890045247MaRDI QIDQ1633652FDOQ1633652

Authors John Duggan 

Publication date 20 December 2018

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.08.006

zbMATH Keywords

coreradial symmetryvoting rulegradient restrictionplott conditions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
• Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
• Smooth social choice
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3930664

Cites Work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3424863 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3185418 (Why is no real title available?)
• Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions
• Convex Analysis
• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria
• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules

Cited In (2)

• Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets
• Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences

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