A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
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Publication:3048532
DOI10.2307/1910411zbMATH Open0413.90004OpenAlexW2059347485MaRDI QIDQ3048532FDOQ3048532
Authors: Salvador Barberà 
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1910411
Cited In (13)
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
- Salvador Barberà
- Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
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