Constrained allocation of projects to heterogeneous workers with preferences over peers

DOI10.1515/bejte-2017-0038OpenAlexW2607028563MaRDI QIDQ2098956

Flip Klijn

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0038

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymatchingheterogeneous agentsallocation(group) strategy-proofnesspreferences over peers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Matching with quorums
• A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
• A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• On Coalition Incentive Compatibility

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