Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.004zbMath1176.91033arXivmath/0702752OpenAlexW1969134666WikidataQ115927465 ScholiaQ115927465MaRDI QIDQ1042332

Geoffrey Pritchard, Mark C. Wilson

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0702752

zbMATH Keywords

social choicescoring rulemanipulationimpartial cultureanti-pluralityborda

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

Is it ever safe to vote strategically? ⋮ On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules

Cites Work

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• On probability models in voting theory

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