On avoiding vote swapping

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0923-2MaRDI QIDQ284364zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent Merlin

Publication date 18 May 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0923-2

zbMATH Keywords

gerrymanderingmanipulation of electionrepresentative democracyvote swapping

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
• Swap bribery
• Vote trading in public elections
• Reflections on vote manipulation
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election

Cites work

• Axiomatic districting
• Consistent representative democracy
• Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: why ``pack and crack does not work
• Two-stage discrete aggregation: The Ostrogorski paradox and related phenomena
• Vote trading and subset sums
• Vote trading in public elections

Cited in

(3)

• Vote trading in public elections
• Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
• Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing

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