Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.09.040MaRDI QIDQ1786787zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hayrullah Dindar, Lainé, Jean

Publication date 25 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.09.040

zbMATH Keywords

group manipulationrepresentative democracyvote pairing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives and consistency of coice
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On avoiding vote swapping
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness

Cited in

(3)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747953 (Why is no real title available?)
• Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures
• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules

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