scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747953

zbMATH Open1366.91086MaRDI QIDQ5283025FDOQ5283025

Authors: Krzysztof Magiera, Piotr Faliszewski 

Publication date: 18 July 2017

Full work available at URL: http://ebooks.iospress.nl/volumearticle/37003

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

Recommendations

• How hard is it to control an election?
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
• Elections with few voters: candidate control can be easy
• Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
• Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
• Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: towards a unified model
• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (5)

• The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
• The complexity of priced control in elections
• A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
• Combinatorial voter control in elections
• On the complexity of constructive control under nearly single-peaked preferences

This page was built for publication:

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5283025)