Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems
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Publication:5964076
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2016.02.003zbMath1336.68151arXiv1304.3145OpenAlexW2255690837MaRDI QIDQ5964076
Publication date: 26 February 2016
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1304.3145
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
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