Strategic voting in negotiating teams

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_14OpenAlexW3208688865MaRDI QIDQ2695442

Noam Hazon, Leora Schmerler

Publication date: 31 March 2023

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.14097

zbMATH Keywords

votingnegotiationmanipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams

Cites Work

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• Barriers to Manipulation in Voting
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• Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems

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