Collective decision making
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Publication:6602233
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-06164-7_18zbMATH Open1547.68757MaRDI QIDQ6602233FDOQ6602233
Authors: Sylvain Bouveret, Jérôme Lang, Michel Lemaître 
Publication date: 11 September 2024
Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
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