Bribery in voting with CP-nets

DOI10.1007/S10472-013-9330-5MaRDI QIDQ2436697zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nicholas Mattei, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable

Publication date 25 February 2014

Published in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-013-9330-5

zbMATH Keywords

votingsocial choicebriberyCP-nets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets
• Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets
• How hard is bribery in elections?
• Frugal bribery in voting
• Swap bribery

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2243357 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Determining possible and necessary winners given partial orders
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• How hard is bribery in elections?
• Incompleteness and incomparability in preference aggregation: complexity results
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Multivariate complexity analysis of Swap Bribery
• Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
• On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
• Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Swap bribery
• The Complexity of Probabilistic Lobbying
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• The paradox of multiple elections
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

Cited in

(12)

• Complexity results for preference aggregation over (\(m\))CP-nets: Pareto and majority voting
• The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
• Swap bribery
• Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets
• How hard is safe bribery?
• On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets
• Local distance constrained bribery in voting
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
• Expressive efficiency of two kinds of specific CP-nets
• Frugal bribery in voting
• Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences
• On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• CP-nets

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