Bribery in voting with CP-nets
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Publication:2436697
DOI10.1007/S10472-013-9330-5zbMATH Open1282.91095OpenAlexW1996949426MaRDI QIDQ2436697FDOQ2436697
Authors: Nicholas Mattei, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable 
Publication date: 25 February 2014
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-013-9330-5
Recommendations
Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
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- How hard is bribery in elections?
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice
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- The Complexity of Probabilistic Lobbying
Cited In (12)
- Complexity results for preference aggregation over (\(m\))CP-nets: Pareto and majority voting
- Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- On the complexity of bribery with distance restrictions
- The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections
- How hard is safe bribery?
- On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets
- Local distance constrained bribery in voting
- Swap bribery
- Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences
- Expressive efficiency of two kinds of specific CP-nets
- Frugal bribery in voting
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