Bribery in voting with CP-nets

DOI10.1007/s10472-013-9330-5zbMath1282.91095MaRDI QIDQ2436697

Francesca Rossi, Maria Silvia Pini, Kristen Brent Venable, Nicholas Mattei

Publication date: 25 February 2014

Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-013-9330-5

zbMATH Keywords

voting; social choice; bribery; CP-nets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68Q25: Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity

91B12: Voting theory

91B10: Group preferences

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-nets, Expressive efficiency of two kinds of specific CP-nets, Frugal bribery in voting, Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets

Uses Software

• CP-nets

Cites Work

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