Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet
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Publication:2500711
DOI10.1007/s00355-005-0045-3zbMath1132.91403OpenAlexW2029664262MaRDI QIDQ2500711
Publication date: 18 August 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0045-3
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