Election control through social influence with voters' uncertainty
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Publication:2168756
DOI10.1007/s10878-022-00852-3zbMath1498.91182OpenAlexW4214750287MaRDI QIDQ2168756
Gianlorenzo D'Angelo, Mohammad Abouei Mehrizi, Federico Corò, Emilio Cruciani
Publication date: 26 August 2022
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-022-00852-3
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