Election control through social influence with voters' uncertainty

DOI10.1007/s10878-022-00852-3zbMath1498.91182OpenAlexW4214750287MaRDI QIDQ2168756

Gianlorenzo D'Angelo, Mohammad Abouei Mehrizi, Federico Corò, Emilio Cruciani

Publication date: 26 August 2022

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-022-00852-3

zbMATH Keywords

computational social choicesocial influenceinfluence maximizationelection control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Election control through social influence with unknown preferences
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• Multi-winner Election Control via Social Influence
• Control and Bribery in Voting
• Election Manipulation on Social Networks: Seeding, Edge Removal, Edge Addition
• Social Networks with Competing Products

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