Election Manipulation on Social Networks: Seeding, Edge Removal, Edge Addition

DOI10.1613/jair.1.12826OpenAlexW3198301595MaRDI QIDQ5154753

Diodato Ferraioli, Nicola Gatti, Matteo Castiglioni, Giulia Landriani

Publication date: 5 October 2021

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.06198

zbMATH Keywords

game theorypreferencesmultiagent-systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Related Items

Election control through social influence with voters' uncertainty

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On Bharathi-Kempe-Salek conjecture for influence maximization on arborescence
• On the inapproximability of maximum intersection problems
• Election control through social influence with unknown preferences
• A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
• Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks
• Information Retention in Heterogeneous Majority Dynamics
• Almost-polynomial ratio ETH-hardness of approximating densest k-subgraph
• Strategic monitor placement against malicious flows
• On the effectiveness of social proof recommendations in markets with multiple products
• Influence Maximization in Undirected Networks