Election manipulation on social networks: seeding, edge removal, edge addition

DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.12826MaRDI QIDQ5154753zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matteo Castiglioni, Diodato Ferraioli, Nicola Gatti, Giulia Landriani

Publication date 5 October 2021

Published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.06198

zbMATH Keywords

game theorymultiagent-systemspreferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
• Almost-polynomial ratio ETH-hardness of approximating densest k-subgraph
• Election control through social influence with unknown preferences
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6474901 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1330033 (Why is no real title available?)
• Influence Maximization in Undirected Networks
• Information retention in heterogeneous majority dynamics
• Linear degree extractors and the inapproximability of max clique and chromatic number
• Minority becomes majority in social networks
• On Bharathi-Kempe-Salek conjecture for influence maximization on arborescence
• On the effectiveness of social proof recommendations in markets with multiple products
• On the inapproximability of maximum intersection problems
• Strategic monitor placement against malicious flows

Cited in

(6)

• Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules
• Election control through social influence with voters' uncertainty
• The swing voter's curse in social networks
• Heuristics for opinion diffusion via local elections
• Discrete preference games with logic-based agents: formal framework, complexity, and islands of tractability
• A complexity-theoretic analysis of majority illusion in social networks

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