Swap bribery
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Abstract: In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery where the price of each vote depends on the amount of change that the voter is asked to implement. Specifically, in our model the briber can change a voter's preference list by paying for a sequence of swaps of consecutive candidates. Each swap may have a different price; the price of a bribery is the sum of the prices of all swaps that it involves. We prove complexity results for this model, which we call swap bribery, for a broad class of election systems, including variants of approval and k-approval, Borda, Copeland, and maximin.
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