Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
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Cites work
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules
- Clustering to minimize the maximum intercluster distance
- Distributed monitoring of election winners
- Dogson's rule and Yong's rule
- Fundamentals of parameterized complexity
- How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2234775 (Why is no real title available?)
- Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables
- Multivariate complexity analysis of Swap Bribery
- On stable rules for selecting committees
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
- On the computation of fully proportional representation
- Parameterized algorithms
- Parametrized complexity theory.
- Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules
- Rationalizations of Voting Rules
- Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
- Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules
- Robustness radius for Chamberlin-Courant on restricted domains
- Swap bribery
- The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
- The complexity of Kemeny elections
- The complexity theory companion
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
- Toward Computing the Margin of Victory in Single Transferable Vote Elections
- Voting and bribing in single-exponential time
Cited in
(10)- Majority tournaments: Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions under amendment procedure
- Sophisticated voting rules: The case of two tournaments
- Robustness of approval-based multiwinner voting rules
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives
- Winner determination and manipulation in minisum and minimax committee elections
- Robustness among multiwinner voting rules
- Robustness of participatory budgeting outcomes: complexity and experiments
- How to tamper with a parliament: strategic campaigns in apportionment elections
- When far is better: the Chamberlin-Courant approach to obnoxious committee selection
- Monotonicity and robustness of majority rule
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