The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
- Condorcet’s Paradox
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
- The Problem of $m$ Rankings
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
- Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
Cited in
(12)- Need for Diversity in Elected Decision-Making Bodies: Economics-Related Analysis
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
- How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
- From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
- Transformation into anti-manipulation method in voting. Changes in properties
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions
- Consequences of reversing preferences
- The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections
- On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
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