The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
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Publication:459405
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2013.07.007zbMATH Open1296.91101OpenAlexW1996457039MaRDI QIDQ459405FDOQ459405
Authors: William V. Gehrlein, Issofa Moyouwou, Dominique Lepelley 
Publication date: 8 October 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.07.007
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Cites Work
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- Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
- Condorcet’s Paradox
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Cited In (12)
- Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser
- On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- How does separability affect the desirability of referendum election outcomes?
- Need for Diversity in Elected Decision-Making Bodies: Economics-Related Analysis
- The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections
- From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- Consequences of reversing preferences
- Transformation into anti-manipulation method in voting. Changes in properties
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
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