The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
From MaRDI portal
Publication:459405
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.07.007zbMath1296.91101OpenAlexW1996457039MaRDI QIDQ459405
Dominique Lepelley, Issofa Moyouwou, William V. Gehrlein
Publication date: 8 October 2014
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.07.007
Related Items (6)
A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser ⋮ From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation ⋮ On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
- Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Condorcet’s Paradox
- The Problem of $m$ Rankings
- The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
This page was built for publication: The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
