Preferences single-peaked on a tree: multiwinner elections and structural results
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Publication:5026258
DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.12332OpenAlexW3040875172WikidataQ130979499 ScholiaQ130979499MaRDI QIDQ5026258FDOQ5026258
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Cites Work
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- Bounded single-peaked width and proportional representation
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- Exact algorithms and applications for tree-like Weighted Set Cover
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- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
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- Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: complexity and algorithms
- Reducibility among combinatorial problems
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- Single-peaked orders on a tree
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- Strategy-proof location on a network
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- The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
- The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
- Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
Cited In (11)
- Bounded single-peaked width and proportional representation
- On the complexity of Chamberlin-Courant on almost structured profiles
- The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: complexity and algorithms
- The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
- Are there any nicely structured preference profiles nearby?
- SINGLE PEAKED FUZZY PREFERENCES IN ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODELS: DOES BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM HOLD?
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree
- Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice
- OWA-based extensions of the Chamberlin-Courant rule
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
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