Preferences single-peaked on a tree: multiwinner elections and structural results
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5026258
DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.12332OpenAlexW3040875172WikidataQ130979499 ScholiaQ130979499MaRDI QIDQ5026258FDOQ5026258
Authors: Dominik Peters, Lan Yu, Hau Chan, Edith Elkind
Publication date: 7 February 2022
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.06549
Recommendations
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: complexity and algorithms
- Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle
- Bounded single-peaked width and proportional representation
- On the complexity of Chamberlin-Courant on almost structured profiles
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Reducibility among Combinatorial Problems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The complexity of Kemeny elections
- Clustering to minimize the maximum intercluster distance
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- Single-peaked orders on a tree
- Simple Linear-Time Algorithms to Test Chordality of Graphs, Test Acyclicity of Hypergraphs, and Selectively Reduce Acyclic Hypergraphs
- Strategy-proof location on a network
- A REVIEW OF TREE CONVEX SETS TEST
- Exact complexity of the winner problem for Young elections
- Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- On the complexity of achieving proportional representation
- The complexity of fully proportional representation for single-crossing electorates
- On the computation of fully proportional representation
- Exact algorithms and applications for tree-like Weighted Set Cover
- The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
- A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Unidimensional Unfolding Representations
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Incomplete Preferences in Single-Peaked Electorates
- Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle
- Condorcet domains, median graphs and the single-crossing property
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: complexity and algorithms
- Unanimous and Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Single-Peaked Preference Profiles on Graphs
- Sorting out single-crossing preferences on networks
- Exact analysis of Dodgson elections: Lewis Carroll's 1876 voting system is complete for parallel access to NP
Cited In (5)
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary graph: complexity and algorithms
- SINGLE PEAKED FUZZY PREFERENCES IN ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODELS: DOES BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM HOLD?
- Recognizing single-peaked preferences on a tree
- Preference elicitation and robust winner determination for single- and multi-winner social choice
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
This page was built for publication: Preferences single-peaked on a tree: multiwinner elections and structural results
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5026258)