Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
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Cites work
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
- Bilateral Trading Processes, Pairwise Optimally, and Pareto Optimality
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- On cores and indivisibility
- Pairwise, t-Wise, and Pareto Optimalities
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(9)- Top trading cycles
- Characterization of top trading cycles with single-dipped preferences
- Some new characterizations of top trading cycles
- Ekici's reclaim-proof allocations revisited
- Characterizing the top trading cycles rule for housing markets with lexicographic preferences when externalities are limited
- Efficient reallocation of indivisible resources: pair-efficiency versus Pareto-efficiency
- Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets
- Characterizing TTC via endowments-swapping-proofness and truncation-proofness
- A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement
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