Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6167384
Abstract: Kidney exchange programs (KEP's) represent an additional possibility of transplant for patients suffering from end stage kidney disease. If a patient has a willing living donor with whom the patient is not compatible, the pair patient--donor can join a pool of incompatible pairs and, if compatibility between patient and donor in two our more pairs exists, organs can be exchanged between them. The problem can be modeled as an integer program that, in general, aims at finding the pairs that should be selected for transplant such that maximum number of transplants is performed. In this paper we consider that for each patient there may exist a preference order over the organs that he/she can receive, since a patient may be compatible with several donors but may have a better fit over some than over others. Under this setting, the aim is to find the maximum cardinality stable exchange, a solution where no blocking cycle exists. For this purpose we propose three novel integer programming models based on the well-known edge and cycle formulations. These formulations are adjusted for both finding stable and strongly stable exchanges under strict preferences and for the case when ties in preferences may exist. Furthermore, we study a situation when the stability requirement can be relaxed by addressing the trade-off between maximum cardinality versus number of blocking cycles allowed in a solution. The effectiveness of the proposed models is assessed through extensive computational experiments on a wide set of instances.
Cites work
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- Kidney Exchange
- Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists
- New insights on integer-programming models for the kidney exchange problem
- On cores and indivisibility
- On the kidney exchange problem: cardinality constrained cycle and chain problems on directed graphs: a survey of integer programming approaches
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Three-Dimensional Stabl Matching Problems
- Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(7)- Randomized parameterized algorithms for the kidney exchange problem
- Optimization methods and algorithms
- Top trading cycles
- On a many-sided matching problem with mixed preferences
- Local stability in kidney exchange programs
- Operational research approaches and mathematical models for kidney exchange: a literature survey and empirical evaluation
- Multi-objective robust optimization for facility location problem of personalized medicine supply chain
This page was built for publication: Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6167384)