Local stability in kidney exchange programs
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
- A Polyhedral Description of Kernels
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Fractional kernels in digraphs
- Half-cycle: a new formulation for modelling kidney exchange problems
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- Kernels in directed graphs: A poison game
- Kernels in perfect line-graphs
- Kidney Exchange
- New insights on integer-programming models for the kidney exchange problem
- Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem
- NP-complete stable matching problems
- On cores and indivisibility
- On kernels and semikernels of digraphs
- On the stable marriage polytope
- Perfect graphs with polynomially computable kernels
- Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games
- Recourse in Kidney Exchange Programs
- Three-Dimensional Stabl Matching Problems
- Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
- Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games
This page was built for publication: Local stability in kidney exchange programs
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6982536)
