Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.11.009MaRDI QIDQ2078057zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick Harless, William Phan

Publication date 25 February 2022

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.009

zbMATH Keywords

convex combinationsefficiencyguaranteeobject allocationpriority rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cited in

(4)

• Efficient priority rules
• Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate
• Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
• Efficient assignment respecting priorities

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