Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
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(76)- Linear programming brings marital bliss
- Stable matchings and linear inequalities
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- On the stable b-matching polytope.
- On a cutting plane heuristic for the stable roommates problem and its applications
- A polynomial-time algorithm for the bistable roommates problem
- Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents
- The object allocation problem with random priorities
- Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching
- ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
- On stable matchings and flows
- A note on ex-ante stable lotteries
- Perfect matching interdiction problem restricted to a stable vertex
- The stable b-matching polytope revisited
- On the stable marriage polytope
- Canonical monotone decompositions of fractional stable matchings
- Stable matchings and linear programming
- Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
- Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
- Stable fractional matchings
- A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- A characterization of strongly stable fractional matchings
- An enhanced approach for two-sided matching with 2-tuple linguistic multi-attribute preference
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
- Jointly stable matchings
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Blockers and antiblockers of stable matchings
- Disjoint stable matchings in linear time
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
- Stable allocations and partially ordered sets
- Marriage market with indifferences: a linear programming approach
- The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications
- Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
- Stable matchings of teachers to schools
- The price of matching with metric preferences
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- Stable marriages and search frictions
- Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents
- The Maximum-Weight Stable Matching Problem: Duality and Efficiency
- Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-Duality
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7626775 (Why is no real title available?)
- Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach
- An algorithm for the maximum weight strongly stable matching problem
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- Fractional matching markets
- Polyhedral aspects of stable marriage
- A 25/17-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem with one-sided ties
- Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
- Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Stable matching: An integer programming approach
- On the set of stable matchings in a bipartite graph
- Integer programming methods to identify Nash equilibrium solutions for platform-based scheduling games
- Maximum matchings and popularity
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment
- Impossibility results for weak strategy-proofness and respect for improvements in random assignment with priorities
- Tâtonnement in matching markets
- Proportional representation in matching markets: selecting multiple matchings under dichotomous preferences
- Ex-post stability under two-sided matching: complexity and characterization
- Scarf's algorithm on arborescence hypergraphs
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting
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