Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_16MaRDI QIDQ2819459zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, Serge Gaspers, Ronald de Haan, Nicholas Mattei, Baharak Rastegari

Publication date 29 September 2016

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://dare.uva.nl/personal/pure/en/publications/stable-matching-with-uncertain-linear-preferences(7f97f707-439a-491c-bafb-86320cef80a6).html

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitytwo-sided stable matchinguncertainty of agents' preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Improved approximation results for the stable marriage problem
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
• On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
• Stable marriage and indifference
• Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
• The Potts model and the Tutte polynomial.

Cited in

(17)

• Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners
• Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
• Stable matching with uncertain pairwise preferences
• Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences
• Robust and approximately stable marriages under partial information
• Pareto optimal allocation under uncertain preferences: uncertainty models, algorithms, and complexity
• Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences
• Complexity study for the robust stable marriage problem
• Jointly stable matchings
• Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
• Stable Matching with Evolving Preferences
• Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem
• Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
• Multi-agent task allocation under unrestricted environments
• Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences
• Computational complexity of \(k\)-stable matchings
• Commitment under uncertainty: Two-stage stochastic matching problems

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