Stable Matching with Evolving Preferences
From MaRDI portal
Abstract: We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an approximately stable matching (in terms of number of blocking pairs) at all times. The changes in the preference lists are not reported to the algorithm, but must instead be probed explicitly by the algorithm. We design an algorithm that in expectation and with high probability maintains a matching that has at most blocking pairs.
Recommendations
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
- Stable matching with special preference patterns
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences
- Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
- Stable matching with couples: an empirical study
- Dynamically stable matching
- Stable matching with incomplete information
Cited in
(8)- Overlays with preferences: distributed, adaptive approximation algorithms for matching with preference lists
- Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
- Optimally sorting evolving data
- Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Partial sorting problem on evolving data
- Online 2-stage stable matching
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
This page was built for publication: Stable Matching with Evolving Preferences
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4636469)
