Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2026.02.006MaRDI QIDQ6839146zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Dušan Knop, Jun-Jie Luo, Rolf Niedermeier

Publication date 24 March 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2026.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

fixed-parameter tractabilityparameterized complexityNP-hard problemsstable marriagestable roommates

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7378730 (Why is no real title available?)
• A new fixed point approach for stable networks and stable marriages
• A stable marriage requires communication
• A theory and algorithms for combinatorial reoptimization
• Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
• An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
• Complexity study for the robust stable marriage problem
• Deepening the (parameterized) complexity analysis of incremental stable matching problems
• Dynamic parameterized problems
• Dynamic rank-maximal and popular matchings
• Efficient algorithms for generalized stable marriage and roommates problems
• Fundamentals of parameterized complexity
• Hard variants of stable marriage.
• How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates?
• Incremental Clustering and Dynamic Information Retrieval
• Incremental list coloring of graphs, parameterized by conservation
• Jointly stable matchings
• Linear programming brings marital bliss
• Maintaining Near-Popular Matchings
• On the complexity of robust stable marriage
• On the parameterized complexity of dynamic problems
• Parameterized algorithms
• Parameterized complexity and local search approaches for the stable marriage problem with ties
• Parameterized dynamic cluster editing
• Reoptimization of parameterized problems
• Stable Matching with Evolving Preferences
• Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search
• Stable marriage and indifference
• Stable marriage and roommates problems with restricted edges: complexity and approximability
• Stable matching with uncertain linear preferences
• The Structure of the Stable Roommate Problem: Efficient Representation and Enumeration of All Stable Assignments

This page was built for publication: Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6839146)