Ex-post stability under two-sided matching: complexity and characterization
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
- A theory of school-choice lotteries
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
- An algorithm for the maximum weight strongly stable matching problem
- Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
- Hard variants of stable marriage.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- Improving community cohesion in school choice via correlated-lottery implementation
- On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- School Choice with Consent*
- Stable fractional matchings
- Stable marriage and indifference
- Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
- Strongly stable matchings in time \(O(nm)\) and extension to the hospitals-residents problem
- The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications
- The object allocation problem with random priorities
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
This page was built for publication: Ex-post stability under two-sided matching: complexity and characterization
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7255555)
