Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment
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Cites work
- A model of partnership formation
- A Reformulation of the Marginal Productivity Theory of Distribution
- Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property
- Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
- Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game.
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3997573 (Why is no real title available?)
- On cores and indivisibility
- On one-sided versus two-sided matching games
- On removing a vertex from the assignment polytope
- On the core of linear production games
- On the extreme points of a certain convex polytope
- Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
- Permutation games: Another class of totally balanced games
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Stable matchings and linear inequalities
- Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
- The assignment game. I: The core
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