Stable matching: An integer programming approach

DOI10.3982/TE4830MaRDI QIDQ6053647zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chao Huang

Publication date 23 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03418

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityinteger programmingcomplementaritytwo-sided matchingtotal unimodularitymany-to-one matchingdemand type

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Integer programming (90C10) Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete matching market when firms' preference profile satisfies a total unimodularity condition that is compatible with various forms of complementarities. We provide a class of firms' preference profiles that satisfy this condition.

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