The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Approximate random allocation mechanisms
- Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
- Markov Chains as Random Input Automata
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- The object allocation problem with random priorities
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