Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
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Cites work
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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- Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
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- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
- Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Cited in
(19)- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
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- Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
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- A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences
- On popular random assignments
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Evaluating assignment without transfers: a market perspective
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- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Random assignments with uniform preferences: an impossibility result
- On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems
- A new impossibility result for random assignments
- Impossibility results in the probabilistic assignment problem with stochastic same-sidedness and minimal invariance
- On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
- Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
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