Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
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(12)- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- A new impossibility result for random assignments
- On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems
- When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4092750 (Why is no real title available?)
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
- A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
- Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment
- Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable
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