Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.005zbMath1419.91403OpenAlexW2908019515WikidataQ60309797 ScholiaQ60309797MaRDI QIDQ1729671

Jun Zhang

Publication date: 28 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessefficiencyrandom assignmentstrong group manipulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (5)

Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment ⋮ When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? ⋮ Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences

Cites Work

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• Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
• Non-bossiness
• Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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