The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem

DOI10.1287/MOOR.27.3.485.310MaRDI QIDQ5704093zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mourad Baïou, Michel Balinski

Publication date 11 November 2005

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.27.3.485.310

zbMATH Keywords

many-to-many matchingordinal transportationstable allocationstable assignmentstable marriagestable matchingtwo-sided marketuniversity admissions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Boolean programming (90C09) Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(30)

• Graphs of transportation polytopes
• Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
• The object allocation problem with random priorities
• Incentivizing resilience in financial networks
• Stable multicommodity flows
• Stable flows over time
• On stable matchings and flows
• Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with applications to stable matchings
• The stable b-matching polytope revisited
• Student admissions and faculty recruitment
• The integral stable allocation problem on graphs
• Faster algorithms for stable allocation problems
• Paths to stable allocations
• David Gale in Paris
• Stable schedule matchings
• Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
• Stable allocations and partially ordered sets
• A coloring property for stable allocations
• On stable matchings and flows
• Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems
• The Generalized Stable Allocation Problem
• Finding a stable allocation in polymatroid intersection
• Finding a stable allocation in polymatroid intersection
• Equitable representation and recruitment
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
• Choice functions on posets
• Stable sharing
• Popular matchings with weighted voters
• On stable assignments generated by choice functions of mixed type
• Scarf's algorithm on arborescence hypergraphs

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