Student admissions and faculty recruitment
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Publication:1885915
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2004.03.011zbMath1073.91057OpenAlexW1997300850MaRDI QIDQ1885915
Publication date: 12 November 2004
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2004.03.011
Related Items (6)
Improving the Chilean College Admissions System ⋮ Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings ⋮ Online 2-stage stable matching ⋮ How hard is it to satisfy (almost) all roommates ⋮ Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism ⋮ Equitable representation and recruitment
Cites Work
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- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
- Graphs and Marriages
- Of Stable Marriages and Graphs, and Strategy and Polytopes
- The Stable Allocation (or Ordinal Transportation) Problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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