A one-sided many-to-many matching problem

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.07.006zbMath1394.91306OpenAlexW2744393899MaRDI QIDQ2402821

Yasunori Okumura

Publication date: 14 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.07.006

zbMATH Keywords

matchingnetwork formationmarket designstrategy-proofmaximum \(c\)-matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

On the number of employed in the matching model, Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange
• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
• Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Unequal connections
• Stable networks
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• Priority matchings revisited
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
• Strongly stable networks
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
• Paths, Trees, and Flowers
• A dynamic model of barter exchange
• Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage