The kidney exchange problem: how hard is it to find a donor?
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Publication:1931639
DOI10.1007/s10479-010-0691-4zbMath1254.91069OpenAlexW2013588952MaRDI QIDQ1931639
Vladimír Lacko, Katarína Cechlárova
Publication date: 15 January 2013
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0691-4
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- The cycle roommates problem: a hard case of kidney exchange
- Kidney Exchange
- MAXIMUM WEIGHT CYCLE PACKING IN DIRECTED GRAPHS, WITH APPLICATION TO KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
- Algorithms and Computation
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