The kidney exchange problem: how hard is it to find a donor?

DOI10.1007/s10479-010-0691-4zbMath1254.91069OpenAlexW2013588952MaRDI QIDQ1931639

Vladimír Lacko, Katarína Cechlárova

Publication date: 15 January 2013

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0691-4

zbMATH Keywords

NP-completenesscorecooperative gamekidney transplantation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (5)

Randomized parameterized algorithms for the kidney exchange problem ⋮ The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Hardness results for stable exchange problems ⋮ Efficiency in lung transplant allocation strategies

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Stability in coalition formation games
• Computational complexity of stable partitions with b-preferences
• On cores and indivisibility
• The cycle roommates problem: a hard case of kidney exchange
• Kidney Exchange
• MAXIMUM WEIGHT CYCLE PACKING IN DIRECTED GRAPHS, WITH APPLICATION TO KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
• Algorithms and Computation

This page was built for publication: The kidney exchange problem: how hard is it to find a donor?