The cycle roommates problem: a hard case of kidney exchange
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Cites work
- An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5049926 (Why is no real title available?)
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- The Structure of the Stable Roommate Problem: Efficient Representation and Enumeration of All Stable Assignments
Cited in
(14)- The kidney exchange problem: how hard is it to find a donor?
- Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences
- Circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
- Pareto optimality in the kidney exchange Problem
- Solving stable matching problems using answer set programming
- An efficient implementation of the Gale and Shapley ``propose-and-reject algorithm
- Maximum weight cycle packing in directed graphs, with application to kidney exchange programs
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Cycle selections
- Operational research approaches and mathematical models for kidney exchange: a literature survey and empirical evaluation
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