Algorithms and Computation

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Publication:5712123

DOI10.1007/b104582zbMath1116.90393OpenAlexW2491382297MaRDI QIDQ5712123

Katarína Cechlárova, David F. Manlove, Kurt Mehlhorn, David J. Abraham

Publication date: 22 December 2005

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/b104582




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