Envy-freeness in house allocation problems
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Publication:2334840
Abstract: We consider the house allocation problem, where houses are to be assigned to agents so that each agent gets exactly one house. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether an envy-free assignment exists, and if so, computes one such assignment. We also show that an envy-free assignment exists with high probability if the number of houses exceeds the number of agents by a logarithmic factor.
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Cites work
- Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
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- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
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Cited in
(12)- The envy-free matching problem with pairwise preferences
- Envy-free matchings with one-sided preferences and matroid constraints
- On the complexity of fair house allocation
- Your college dorm and dormmates: fair resource sharing with externalities
- Closing gaps in asymptotic fair division
- House allocation with fractional endowments
- On the number of almost envy-free allocations
- Fair multi-cake cutting
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Algorithms and Computation
- Fair cake-cutting among families
- Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division
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