Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division
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Publication:6154777
Graph algorithms (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C85) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Extremal problems in graph theory (05C35) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70)
Abstract: A matching in a bipartite graph with parts X and Y is called envy-free if no unmatched vertex in X is a adjacent to a matched vertex in Y. Every perfect matching is envy-free, but envy-free matchings exist even when perfect matchings do not. We prove that every bipartite graph has a unique partition such that all envy-free matchings are contained in one of the partition sets. Using this structural theorem, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for finding an envy-free matching of maximum cardinality. For edge-weighted bipartite graphs, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a maximum-cardinality envy-free matching of minimum total weight. We show how envy-free matchings can be used in various fair division problems with either continuous resources ("cakes") or discrete ones. In particular, we propose a symmetric algorithm for proportional cake-cutting, an algorithm for 1-out-of-(2n-2) maximin-share allocation of discrete goods, and an algorithm for 1-out-of-floor(2n/3) maximin-share allocation of discrete bads among n agents.
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Cites work
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