Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
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Cites work
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- House allocation with existing tenants
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784404 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- Kidney Exchange
- On cores and indivisibility
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(8)- Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
- Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market
- Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability
- Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
- A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets
- Farsighted house allocation
- Minimal enforceability and indirect domination relations in the Shapley-Scarf economy
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
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