Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
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Recommendations
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3993287
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Cites work
- A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Implementability via protective equilibria
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Non-emptiness of the alpha-core: sufficient and necessary conditions
- On cores and indivisibility
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Protective behavior in matching models
- Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
- The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
- The roommate problem with externalities
- Two-sided matching problems with externalities
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(10)- Purification of incentive compatible allocations
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities
- Dominant strategy implementation in multi-unit allocation problems
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- An analysis of an incentive problem considering non‐monetary utility
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3993287 (Why is no real title available?)
- Notes on marriage markets with weak externalities
- Intertemporal incentive allocation in simple hierarchies
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