Egalitarian-utilitarian bounds in Nash's bargaining problem

DOI10.1007/s11238-015-9510-3zbMath1378.91097OpenAlexW873870959MaRDI QIDQ266513

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Publication date: 13 April 2016

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9510-3

zbMATH Keywords

boundsutilitarianismbargainingNash bargaining solutionegalitarianismsandwich axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution ⋮ Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry ⋮ The Nash bargaining solution: sometimes more utilitarian, sometimes more egalitarian ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results

Cites Work

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• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Relative Utilitarianism
• “Beat-Your-Rival” Routing Games
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism

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