Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0313-0zbMath1184.91106OpenAlexW2121331682MaRDI QIDQ733775

Marcus Pivato

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0313-0

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingegalitarianimpartial observer theoremrelative utilitarian

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Egalitarian-utilitarian bounds in Nash's bargaining problem ⋮ Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution ⋮ When is utilitarian welfare higher under insurance risk pooling? ⋮ The Nash bargaining solution: sometimes more utilitarian, sometimes more egalitarian ⋮ The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results

Cites Work

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• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
• A Theorem on Utilitarianism
• Impartiality: Definition and Representation
• Relative Utilitarianism
• From separability to unweighted sum: A case for utilitarianism

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