Nonrevelation in Employment Contracts

DOI10.2307/2527053zbMATH Open0803.90044OpenAlexW2089909480MaRDI QIDQ4301653FDOQ4301653

Authors: Peter Kuhn 

Publication date: 14 August 1994

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527053

Recommendations

• Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• A Theory of the Firm with Non-binding Employment Contracts
• Involuntary Layoffs in a Model with Asymmetric Information Concerning Worker Ability
• A characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information

zbMATH Keywords

private informationemployment contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (6)

• Signalling ability to pay and rent sharing dynamics
• The French first employment contract: Efficient screening device or Kleenex contract?
• Information revelation in relational contracts
• Firm-fit transparency and incentives
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Pensions in Labor Contracts

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