Nonrevelation in Employment Contracts

DOI10.2307/2527053MaRDI QIDQ4301653zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Kuhn

Publication date 14 August 1994

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527053

zbMATH Keywords

private informationemployment contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Optimal Labour Contracts when Workers have a Variety of Privately Observed Reservation Wages
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• A Theory of the Firm with Non-binding Employment Contracts
• Involuntary Layoffs in a Model with Asymmetric Information Concerning Worker Ability
• A characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information

Cited in

(6)

• Signalling ability to pay and rent sharing dynamics
• The French first employment contract: Efficient screening device or Kleenex contract?
• Information revelation in relational contracts
• Firm-fit transparency and incentives
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Pensions in Labor Contracts

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