Firm-fit transparency and incentives

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111604MaRDI QIDQ6498754zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Abhishek Ramchandani

Publication date 7 May 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

transparencycontractingcomplacencyemployee-firm fitoutput-effort informativeness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39)

Recommendations

• On Transparency in Organizations
• Peer transparency in teams: does it help or hinder incentives?
• Information acquisition and transparency in committees
• Nonrevelation in Employment Contracts
• Transparency, career concerns, and incentives for acquiring expertise

Cites work

• Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
• On Transparency in Organizations
• Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent

Cited in

(1)

• Equilibrium effects of pay transparency

This page was built for publication: Firm-fit transparency and incentives

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6498754)